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Learning from Copyright’s Failure to Build Its Future 
KEN BURLESON∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Since file sharing emerged in the late 1990s, copyright infringement has been 
widespread and virtually impervious to legal sanctions. Despite the best efforts of 
industry representatives and the lawmakers acting at their behest, attempts to scare 
and shame copyright infringers into compliance with the law have fallen flat. 
Part I of this Note discusses the ongoing conflict between modern copyright law 
and socially acceptable behavior, specifically copyright infringement through 
digital means. Part II explores the various attempts, and subsequent failures, to curb 
infringement through deterrence measures. Part III explains why deterrence has 
been ineffective by exploring psychological models of law-abiding behavior and 
their implications for copyright, given what we know of infringing behavior. Part 
IV explores the education and publicity campaigns that have been implemented in 
an attempt to change the public’s perception of copyright infringement. Part IV also 
explains under a psychological approach why these campaigns have been 
unsuccessful. Part V draws on a cognitive approach to jurisprudence to advocate 
for a new form of copyright to supplement and work around the failing current 
paradigm.1 
I. THE PROBLEM 
 Creative works protected by copyright cannot be duplicated or shared without 
the express consent of the author.2 Nonetheless, digital file sharing is incredibly 
common as Internet users of all ages and demographics download millions of 
copyrighted works on a daily basis.3 This trend extends well beyond the usual 
suspects, college students. Almost half of all adults and three-quarters of young 
                                                                                                                 
 
 ∗ JD/MBA Candidate, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Kelley School of 
Business, 2015. BBA, University of Alaska, Anchorage, 2010. Notes Editor for the Indiana 
Law Journal. Thanks to Michelle Adler and Professor Joseph Hoffmann for their critical 
input to the development of this Note. 
 1. Copyright discussion may encompass music, film, written works, and other creative 
works. In this Note, the lobbying and education efforts of both the music and film industries 
will be discussed because they frequently work in concert and employ similar strategies. The 
solutions advocated in this Note, however, apply more effectively to the realm of music and 
written works. The nature of film and music are so different, from creation to distribution to 
consumption, that a single legal regime for all creative works is neither logical nor practical. 
 2. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 3. Mohsen Manesh, The Immorality of Theft, the Amorality of Infringement, 2006 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶ 4, http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/06_STLR_5 (“Each day, 
millions of Internet file-sharers share and download millions of songs and movies, each time 
infringing on the copyright of the owner. These file-sharers transcend nationalities and 
cultures. Though most are college students, file-sharers exist in nearly all age groups, across 
both sexes, and in all socioeconomic classes.”). 
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people have bought, copied, or downloaded infringing material.4 A single file-
hosting website claimed to have fifty million visits to its website daily before its 
recent decommission.5 Copyright infringement is as common as breaking the speed 
limit: “Almost everyone has recorded copyrighted television broadcasts, 
photocopied copyrighted writings, or made duplicates of cassette tapes or compact 
discs containing copyrighted songs.”6 
This widespread disregard of copyright law poses a large, growing problem, but 
not for the reasons one might think. Commonplace rhetoric in the copyright debate 
is that infringement harms artists and the national interest in encouraging creative 
production.7 The Recording Industry and Artist Association (RIAA), which claims 
to represent the entire music industry,8 alleges that file sharing has a “devastating” 
effect on “songwriters, recording artists, audio engineers, computer technicians, 
talent scouts and marketing specialists, producers, publishers and countless 
others[,]” impacting the entire United States economy.9 Allegedly, “[t]he eventual 
result is there’s no reason to be an artist, because you have to give away your work 
for free.”10 The apocalyptic rhetoric of special interests,11 however, seems inflated 
at best, as file sharing has now continued undeterred for over a decade and new 
music artists continue to emerge and thrive.12 Even claims of the economic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. JOE KARAGANIS, AM. ASSEMBLY, COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND ENFORCEMENT IN 
THE US 2 (2011), http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/AA
-Research-Note-Infringement-and-Enforcement-November-2011.pdf. 
 5. Ed O’Keefe & Ian Shapira, Department of Justice Site Hacked After Megaupload 
Shutdown, Anonymous Claims Credit, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.washington
post.com/business/economy/department-of-justice-site-hacked-after-megaupload-shutdown
-anonymous-claims-credit/2012/01/20/gIQAl5MNEQ_story.html?tid=pm_business_pop. 
 6. Ann Bartow, Arresting Technology: An Essay, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95, 96 (2001). 
 7. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783, 792 (2005). 
 8. This claim is disputed by digital music distributors. See, e.g., Jeff Price, What the RIAA 
Won’t Tell You—TuneCore’s Response to the NY Times Op-Ed by RIAA CEO Cary H. 
Sherman, TUNECORE BLOG (Feb. 16, 2012), http://blog.tunecore.com/2012/02/what-the-riaa
-wont-tell-you-tunecores-response-to-the-ny-times-op-ed-by-the-riaa-ceo-cary-h-sherman.html. 
 9. Who Music Theft Hurts, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content
_selector=piracy_details_online. 
 10. Mark Lewis, Metallica Sues Napster, Universities, Citing Copyright Infringement and 
RICO Violations, SOUNDSPIKE (Apr. 13, 2000, 12:35 PM), http://www.soundspike.com
/story2/781/metallica-sues-napster-universities-citing-copyright-infringement-and-rico-violations/ 
(quoting Metallica attorney Howard King on the effects of file sharing). 
 11. “Left unchecked, Napster threatens the livelihood of every writer and musician.” 
Howard King, Why Metallica Sued Napster, FINDLAW, http://writ.news.findlaw.com
/commentary/20000501_king.html. 
 12. In 2010, 75,000 new albums were released, compared to a mere 38,000 in 2003. 
Timothy B. Lee, Why We Shouldn’t Worry About the (Alleged) Decline of the Music Industry, 
FORBES (Jan. 30, 2012, 6:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2012/01/30/why-we
-shouldnt-worry-about-the-decline-of-the-music-industry/; see also Joel Waldfogel, Bye, Bye, 
Miss American Pie? The Supply of New Recorded Music Since Napster 8 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16882, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers
/w16882.pdf (stating that 97,751 new albums were released in 2009). 
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damages caused by infringement13 are unsubstantiated at best and patently false at 
worst.14  
Claims of the economic harms of copyright infringement obscure a larger 
problem: the impact ongoing infringement has on the integrity of the legal system, 
law enforcement, and the legislature.15 “[P]ublic respect for the law and legal 
authorities has been steadily declining over the past fifty years. . . . At this time, 
dissatisfaction with the law and legal system is widespread and the public generally 
holds lawyers and judges in low regard.”16 Tom R. Tyler, professor of law and 
psychology at Yale, states that in order to maintain a law-abiding society, citizens 
must obey the law because it coincides with their values, not because they fear 
punishment.17 Prohibiting behaviors that are known to be common practice 
jeopardizes the law’s legitimacy and credibility.18 Even if people believe a behavior 
is wrong, they will not respect the law if they believe the punishment for the act is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. The RIAA claims “music sales in the U.S. have dropped 53 percent, from $14.6 billion 
to $7.0 billion in 2011[,]” blaming copyright infringers for the loss. Scope of the Problem, 
RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=piracy-online-scope-of-the
-problem. Statistics supporting these claims are highly criticized and fairly dubious. Two 
economists at the University of Kansas and Harvard Business School found that file sharing 
had a limited effect on sales. See Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File 
Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1, 3 (2007). “[L]arge 
content owners need to prove that any losses they incur are the result of copyright 
infringements, as opposed to dreadful business practices.” Bartow, supra note 6, at 117. 
 14. While the four major record labels have seen decreased revenues, the music industry 
as a whole has seen huge growth from 1999 to 2009: from $132 billion to $168 billion. Lee, 
supra note 12. The story is more controversial in the film industry as box office receipts and 
gross revenues are hitting record highs and executives are taking home record salaries, yet 
jobs are inexplicably still being cut, and these cuts are blamed on copyright infringers. See 
Stephen C. Webster, Movie Executives See Record Profits, Salaries Despite Piracy Fear-
Mongering, RAW STORY (Dec. 13, 2011, 1:05 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/12/13
/movie-executives-see-record-profits-salaries-despite-piracy-fear-mongering/. 
 15. This threat is very real and its effects extend beyond copyright law. “[I]n recent 
years . . . there have been suggestions that the public ignores laws as simple as stopping at 
red lights and as key to society as paying taxes.” Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a 
Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal 
Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 709 
(2000); see also id. at 731 (describing a decline in the perceived legitimacy and 
trustworthiness of the law and legal authorities, as well as general respect for the law, 
stemming from inability to change laws that are inconsistent with personal morals). 
 16. Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological 
Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 230 (1997). 
 17. See Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 708 (“To have a law-abiding society, we must 
have a polity in which citizens have social values that lead them to feel responsible for 
following rules, irrespective of the likelihood of being caught and punished for rule 
breaking.”). 
 18. “If the law prohibits behaviors that are widely known to be common practices, it 
might lose some of its overall legitimacy or credibility.” Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, 
Expressive Law and File Sharing Norms 14 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 05-18, 2005). 
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disproportionate and unjust.19 These warnings describe exactly the situation in 
copyright law, as criminal sanctions and civil penalties have become more extreme 
for infringement, which is socially an increasingly accepted behavior. 
Copyright has conformed to a basic description of overcriminalization and risks 
the same consequences: 
If the community believes these severe sanctions are disproportionate 
to the offense, especially if only a small percentage of personal 
infringers are targeted, then enforcing criminal infringement crimes 
may be detrimental. To the extent that citizens reject rules that target 
people unfairly, they may similarly reject the legal system that 
promulgates and enforces such rules.20 
As citizens reject copyright, not only does the law fail its constitutional purpose, 
it also undermines the effectiveness of the legal system.21 The widespread disregard 
of copyright laws reflects an already decreased respect and deference to the 
legislature that created the law.22 Wholesale disregard of copyright law must be 
addressed, not for the artists or for the economy but for the legitimacy of the legal 
authorities governing our society. While copyright law is not solely responsible for 
the decline of respect for the legal system or the legislature,23 this Note will 
demonstrate that it is a topic that shows a clear and remediable divergence between 
public opinion and law-making trends. 
II. ATTEMPTS TO DETER THEFT THROUGH LEGAL SANCTIONS 
“The effective rule of law requires that citizens comply with the regulatory rules 
enshrined in the law and enforced by legal authorities. Most recent discussions of 
such compliance rest upon the idea that law-breaking behavior is deterred by the 
risk of being caught and punished for wrongdoing.”24  
Thus, some argue that increasing the penalties for copyright infringement is the 
only way to gain compliance.25 They insist that if more people are charged or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. Moohr, supra note 7, at 804 n.75 (“[T]he deterrent effect of sentences may be 
undermined when the community views punishment as disproportionate and unjust.” (citing 
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 481 
(1997))). 
 20. Id. at 805. 
 21. See Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 709 (“If the law is to be effective in fulfilling 
its regulatory role, most citizens must obey most laws most of the time.”). 
 22. “If authorities are legitimate, people are generally willing to accept the rules they 
create, whatever those rules might be.” Tyler, supra note 16, at 229. 
 23. Congress recently tied its all-time low approval rating at ten percent, a public 
assessment that’s been in decline for the past decade. Ariel Edwards-Levy, Congress 
Approval Rating Hits All-Time Low in Gallup Poll, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2012, 9:08 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/14/congress-approval-rating-all-time-low
-gallup-poll_n_1777207.html. 
 24. Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 707. 
 25. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Dispossession, Intellectual Property, and the Sin of 
Theoretical Homogeneity, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 909, 963 (2007). “The results of this study also 
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jailed, or perhaps if the “right” people are held accountable, fear of the law will 
induce compliance. This deterrence-oriented approach is manifest in more stringent 
laws, both civil and criminal, as well as a dramatic increase in litigation 
surrounding copyright. 
Although copyright law has existed since 1790,26 the criminalization of 
copyright violations has taken place mostly in the last thirty years,27 with Congress 
creating the first felony provisions in 1982.28 “[F]ile-sharing has played an essential 
role in the shaping of criminal law sanctions . . . , based on the idea that a few 
instances of harsh sanctions against infringers will provide a deterrent to other 
potential culprits and prove more cost-effective than widespread civil litigation.”29 
Congress originally began ramping up copyright protections in response to pressure 
from the computer software industry, well before the explosion of mainstream file 
sharing.30 When file sharing began in the late 1990s, the previously obscure crime 
of copyright infringement became a mainstream activity virtually overnight.31 
Groups such as the RIAA and Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), 
acting on behalf of rights holders and allegedly on behalf of artists themselves,32 
attempted to address the growing disobedience by lobbying for more favorable 
laws as well as suing those involved with file sharing.33 Even with felony 
provisions in place, copyright infringement was only criminal when committed for 
profit or for commercial purposes until the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act of 1997, 
which “sought to amend criminal copyright infringement provisions by 
criminalizing computer theft of copyrighted works, whether or not the infringer 
                                                                                                                 
suggest that the RIAA may need to step up its prosecution of individual illegal file sharers.” 
Joshua J. Lewer, R. Nicholas Gerlich & Nancy Turner, The Ethics and Economics of File 
Sharing, 35 SW. ECON. REV. 67, 76 (2008). “Congress stated that the best way to deter future 
infringement and to provide incentives to comply with the law was to make ‘the cost of 
infringement . . . substantially exceed the cost of the compliance.’” Kate Cross, Comment, 
David v. Goliath: How the Record Industry Is Winning Substantial Judgments Against 
Individuals for Illegally Downloading Music, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2010) 
(quoting 145 CONG. REC. H12884 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (statement of Rep. Berman)). 
 26. Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property 
Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 481 (2011). 
 27. See Hoffstadt, supra note 25, at 923. 
 28. Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91. 
 29. Manta, supra note 26, at 503. 
 30. Id. at 481–82. 
 31. See Matthew Green, Napster Opens Pandora’s Box: Examining How File-Sharing 
Services Threaten the Enforcement of Copyright on the Internet, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 801–
02 (2002). 
 32. Cf. Courtney Love, Courtney Love Does the Math, SALON (June 14, 2000, 3:02 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2000/06/14/love_7/ (discussing the fact that artists in the music 
industry don’t own the copyrights to their music). 
 33. The RIAA and MPAA have also recently launched elaborate plans to penalize 
alleged file sharers through private mechanisms contractually arranged with Internet service 
providers, outside the limits of the legal system. The results of these arrangements have yet 
to be seen at the time of this writing. See What Is a Copyright Alert?, CTR. COPYRIGHT INFO., 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/alerts; Mitch Stoltz, U.S. Copyright Surveillance 
Machine About to Be Switched On, Promises of Transparency Already Broken, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/11/us-copyright
-surveillance-machine-about-be-switched-on.  
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derives a direct financial benefit from his misappropriation.”34 The RIAA and 
MPAA also convinced Congress to increase criminal penalties to a felony level, 
punishing infringers with fines of up to $250,000 and five years in prison.35 The 
deterrent effects of these criminal penalties have since been described as 
“dismal.”36  
In 1999, Congress raised the limit for civil damages in infringement cases to 
$30,000 for each act of infringement and $150,000 for each knowing act.37 The 
RIAA and MPAA have pursued civil litigation, first seeking to obtain compliance 
by shutting down the file-sharing services, much like closing roads to prevent 
people from exceeding the speed limit. Cases such as A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc.38 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.39 broke 
new ground in copyright liability, but even when litigation was successful in 
shutting down one service, several more services emerged to take its place.40 These 
new services adapted to the changing legal precedents, eliminating central file 
hosting, adopting anti-infringement warnings, and decentralizing their servers to 
frustrate future legal interventions.41  
Perhaps realizing the hopelessness of continuing to sue every new file-sharing 
service, the RIAA adopted possibly the next most hopeless strategy. In September 
2003, the RIAA began suing individual consumers for file sharing,42 and it has 
since “filed, settled, or threatened legal actions against at least 30,000 
individuals.”43 Of the millions of people file sharing, the RIAA has targeted 
“numerous children, a seventy-one year old grandfather, unemployed single 
mothers, people who do not own computers, a homeless man, a deceased woman, 
and a nineteen-year-old transplant patient.”44 The highly publicized litigation 
campaigns successfully taught the public that file sharing is illegal,45 but any 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. Manta, supra note 26, at 482–83. 
 35. Id. at 506. 
 36. Hoffstadt, supra note 25, at 915 (noting the “dismal efficacy” of sentencing for 
intellectual property crimes).  
 37. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RES. SERV., R41415, STATUTORY DAMAGE AWARDS IN PEER-
TO-PEER FILE SHARING CASES INVOLVING COPYRIGHTED SOUND RECORDINGS: RECENT LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 2–3 (2010), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41415.pdf. 
 38. 239 F.3d 1004, 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that file-sharing software 
company hosting shared files could be held liable for contributory and vicarious copyright 
infringement). 
 39. 545 U.S. 913, 918–19 (2005) (holding that file-sharing software companies could be 
held liable for inducing copyright infringement in the course of marketing their software). 
 40. M. Eric Johnson, Dan McGuire & Nicholas D. Willey, The Evolution of the Peer-to-Peer 
File Sharing Industry and the Security Risks for Users, 41 PROC. INT’L CONF. SYS. SCI. (2008), 
available at http://csdl2.computer.org/comp/proceedings/hicss/2008/3075/00 /30750383.pdf. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Manesh, supra note 3, ¶ 32. 
 43. RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 30, 2008), 
https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later. 
 44. Cross, supra note 25, at 1033. 
 45. See Manesh, supra note 3, ¶ 38 (“Users know that file sharing is infringement and 
therefore illegal. Moreover, the recent suits against individual users make clear that file-
sharers risk facing possible legal sanctions for their conduct.”). 
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deterrent effect they had on infringement has since proven only temporary and 
fleeting.46 Civil litigation is also expensive and inefficient since most copyright 
infringers do not have particularly deep pockets and thus cannot pay a court-
ordered judgment substantial enough to cover the cost of litigation, much less the 
penalty itself.47 
Private litigation campaigns and criminal prosecutions have sparked a sizable 
pushback. Predictably, civil litigation has been highly successful at antagonizing 
music consumers,48 even more so due to the fact that the RIAA uses the winnings 
of its civil suits to fund further lawsuits, rather than turning the winnings over to 
the artists allegedly harmed.49 Over-enforcing copyright law has a chilling effect on 
legitimate public use of copyrighted materials,50 including otherwise promising 
new genres and markets built on sampling and remixing the work of others.51 
Beyond stifling new markets, endless litigation campaigns also pose a threat to new 
and existing information-sharing technologies.52 
Perhaps most importantly, enforcing laws that lack social support is likely to 
actively impede the formation of social norms that support the law.53 As it turns 
out, enforcing laws that are viewed as unfair can be very counterproductive:  
New, rigidly enforced restrictions on use and access to copyrighted 
content, especially if accompanied by increased costs, may motivate 
otherwise law-abiding copyright users to circumvent copyright controls 
(or at least to feel increasing sympathy for those who do so). . . . 
[T]hese restrictions do not appear to foster enhanced or principled 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. Lewer et al., supra note 25, at 74; see also Manesh, supra note 3, ¶ 34. 
 47. See Manta, supra note 26, at 503. 
 48. See Alfonso Maruccia, EFF Report: RIAA Legal Crusade Losing Credibility, SIR 
ARTHUR’S DEN (Oct. 2, 2008), http://kingofgng.com/eng/2008/10/02/eff-report-riaa-legal
-crusade-losing-credibility/ (citing RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, supra note 43). 
 49. Mike Masnick, Music Labels Have No Plans to Share Any Money They Get from the 
Pirate Bay with Artists, TECHDIRT (July 31, 2012, 7:08 AM), http://www.techdirt.com
/articles/20120730/18253419886/music-labels-have-no-plans-to-share-any-money-they-get
-pirate-bay-with-artists.shtml. 
 50. See Moohr, supra note 7, at 804. 
 51. REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., RSC POLICY BRIEF: THREE MYTHS ABOUT COPYRIGHT 
LAW AND WHERE TO START TO FIX IT 4 (2012), http://lauren.vortex.com/WITHDRAWN
-Republican-Study-Committee-Intellectual-Property-Brief.pdf (withdrawn). 
 52. Litigation against software and technology developers (as infringement enablers) 
“will chill the development of new technologies, which can be just as useful and creative as 
other content. Those technologies not dissuaded by the chilling effect of almost certain 
litigation will be underground and decentralized, formulated to evade copyright suits, and 
very difficult to enjoin.” Bartow, supra note 6, at 100. For a demonstration of the legitimate 
uses for file-sharing technologies in particular, see The 4-Hour Project, discussing an 
author’s use of file-sharing technology and community to promote his creative work and 
circumvent a controversial publishing market comparable in many ways to the music 
industry. The 4-Hour Project, BITTORRENT BLOG (Nov. 16, 2012), http://blog.bittorrent.com
/2012/11/16/the-4-hour-project/#more-2274. 
 53. Moohr, supra note 7, at 805 (“[E]nforcing rules that do not embody a shared 
community norm may actually undermine the formation of a norm against the forbidden 
conduct.”). 
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respect for copyrights. Instead, they may actually be undermining the 
perceived legitimacy of the copyright laws among the copyrighted 
work consuming populace.54 
The RIAA recently took deterrence to a new level, contracting with Internet 
service providers to deny Internet access to consumers suspected of infringing 
copyrights.55 The reaction of consumers, who have begun to regard Internet access 
as a right rather than a privilege or product,56 has yet to be seen. The following 
analysis suggests, however, that this attempt to scare or “educate” copyright 
infringers while circumventing the legal system will be no more successful at 
deterring infringement than lawsuits have been. 
III. CONSUMERS CAN BE SUED FOR $150,000, FINED $250,000, AND JAILED FOR 
FIVE YEARS FOR DOWNLOADING MUSIC, SO WHY DO PEOPLE STILL DO IT? 
From a psychological standpoint, it is hardly surprising that increased 
punishments for copyright infringement have failed to coerce widespread 
compliance with the law. A number of studies have found that deterrence is the 
least effective method of garnering legal compliance.57 In order for sanctions to 
deter illegal conduct, people must believe they are very likely to be prosecuted if 
they engage in that conduct; however, murder is the only crime that currently meets 
this certainty threshold.58 Threats and warnings are fairly ineffective in deterring 
illegal behavior, and even the perceived risk of certain punishment has only a 
minor influence on law breaking.59 
Psychologists, economists, and other academics have tried time and again to 
explain how “[m]illions, who would never steal a CD or DVD from a music store, 
unhesitatingly share and download songs and movies on the Internet.”60 Theories 
range from social complacency, to Machiavellian personalities, to Robin-Hood-
esque altruism, to basic economic rationality.61 These studies are typically built 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a 
Book, 48 VILL. L. REV. 13, 17 (2003). 
 55. See Martha Neil, RIAA to Stop Suing over Music Downloads; ISPs Are New 
Copyright Cops, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 19, 2008, 2:21 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news
/article/riaa_to_stop_suing_over_music_downloads_isps_are_new_copyright_cops/. 
 56. Nidhi Subbaraman, UN Report: Internet Access Is a Basic Human Right, NBC 
NEWS (June 3, 2011, 6:40 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/technolog/un-report
-internet-access-basic-human-right-122942. 
 57. “Legal prohibitions are an example of external sanctions which . . . are relatively 
weak deterrents of antisocial behavior because most instances of deviance are likely to go 
undetected by the mechanisms that exist to enforce and prosecute them.” Ameetha 
Garbharran & Andrew Thatcher, A Case for Using a Social Cognitive Model to Explain 
Intention to Pirate Software, 7 J. EHEALTH TECH. & APPLICATION, no. 2, 2009, at 87, 89. 
“[P]eople’s compliance with the law is, at best, weakly linked to the risks associated with 
law-breaking behavior.” Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 713. 
 58. See Tyler, supra note 16, at 222–23. 
 59. See Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 713. 
 60. Manesh, supra note 3, ¶ 39. 
 61. “The prevalence of these activities may thus be creating an environment in which 
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upon the assumption that file sharing is morally wrong because illegal activity is 
always morally wrong.62 Perhaps this is why the results of these studies are far 
from conclusive and many of their findings cannot be distinguished as pre-action 
reasoning or post-action rationalizations. While these studies ask, “How do you 
justify breaking the law?” they ought to ask, “Why does it not bother you to break 
the law?” Moral condemnation is either stated or implied, overlooking the 
importance of whether file sharers actually believe their actions are wrong. 
A. Citizens Will Obey Laws That Are Morally Sound, Legitimate, or Both 
Fundamentally, people who engage in file sharing do not seem to believe their 
actions are actually morally wrong.63 “[B]oth statistical and anecdotal evidence 
suggests that file sharers see nothing wrong with infringement. To millions, theft is 
immoral, infringement is not.”64 One of the most powerful factors in determining 
whether citizens will obey a law is whether they agree with the law, based on their 
own morals and the perceived legitimacy of the law.65 Normally this works out 
well, as there is a surprising consensus among Americans regarding what is morally 
                                                                                                                 
students come to accept this unethical and illegal behavior as no different from speeding on 
the freeway when everyone else is doing it.” Lewer et al., supra note 25, at 71 (emphasis 
added); see also Sulaiman Al-Rafee & Timothy Paul Cronan, Digital Piracy: Factors that 
Influence Attitude Toward Behavior, 63 J. BUS. ETHICS 237, 239–41 (2006) (considering 
perceptions of outcomes of infringement, gender and age of infringers, and whether 
infringers exhibit Machiavellian tendencies); Joe Cox, Alan Collins & Stephen Drinkwater, 
Seeders, Leechers and Social Norms: Evidence from the Market for Illicit Digital 
Downloading, 22 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 299, 301 (2010) (speculating as to an altruistic 
“Robin Hood” syndrome driving the behavior of content uploaders); Darryl A. Seale, 
Michael Polakowski & Sherry Schneider, It’s Not Really Theft!: Personal and Workplace 
Ethics that Enable Software Piracy, 17 BEHAV. & INFO. TECH. 27, 29 (1998) (suggesting 
consumers justify infringement based on an assessment of CDs and DVDs costing 
consumers disproportionately more than they cost to produce). 
 62. Cf. Garbharran & Thatcher, supra note 57, at 91 (“The findings of this study 
suggested a significant, direct and positive causal relationship between moral justification 
and deficient self-regulation (diminished self-control) which in turn, had a significant, direct 
and positive causal relationship with intention to continue downloading music.” (citing 
Robert LaRose & Junghyun Kim, Share, Steal, or Buy? A Social Cognitive Perspective of 
Music Downloading, 10 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 267, 267–77 (2007))); Alexander 
Peukert, Why Do ‘Good People’ Disregard Copyright on the Internet?, in CRIMINAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 151, 163–64 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2012). 
 63. Oliver R. Goodenough & Kristin Prehn, A Neuroscientific Approach to Normative 
Judgment in Law and Justice, 359 PHIL. TRANS. ROYAL SOC’Y B 1709, 1721 (2004) (“On a 
very basic level, these copiers do not seem think that this kind of behaviour is really wrong.” 
(emphasis in original)).  
 64. Manesh, supra note 3, ¶ 6 (citations omitted); see also Seale et al., supra note 61, at 
36 (“Although the maximum penalties for copyright infringement have recently been 
increased, results from this and other studies confirm that a high proportion of people believe 
the behaviour is permissible.”). 
 65. See Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 714; Tyler, supra note 16, at 224 (“[M]orality 
[i]s the primary factor shaping law-related behavior. A second important factor concern[s] 
views about the legitimacy of the law.”). 
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right and wrong.66 Despite our tremendous differences culturally, demographically, 
and socially, we agree to an impressive extent on the moral culpability of actions.67 
In the realm of intellectual property, the consensus is that infringement is not 
morally wrong and thus the law does not deserve compliance.68 
People will voluntarily comply with laws that align with their personal morals.69 
Tyler explains: 
Values become a part of the person and lead them to exercise self-
regulation over their behavior so that their behavior is consistent with 
the internal principles and values that define their sense of themselves. 
In such a situation, people do not so much comply with the law as they 
accept and consent to it, deferring to law and legal authority because 
they feel it is the right thing to do.70 
This moral foundation is the most effective basis for a successful system of 
laws. A stable law-abiding society does not rest on fear and apprehension but rather 
on the desire to act appropriately and ethically according to socially accepted 
standards.71 Assessments of the morality of a law, and thus whether or not to 
comply with it, are largely made by intuition, as conscious rationalizations have a 
markedly subordinate effect in determining the moral status of conduct.72 Within 
the context of copyright infringement especially, moral attitudes toward the law 
have been found to be the only variable that predictably affects compliance.73 
In the absence of a corresponding moral foundation, if the society is one that 
respects the rule of law, citizens will often obey laws as long as they perceive those 
laws as being legitimate.74 When moral foundations are shifting or uncertain, 
yielding changing social norms, the law may only command compliance if it is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. Tyler, supra note 16, at 227. 
 67. See Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Principle of Commensurate Deserts, in 
SENTENCING 243, 248 (Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981) (citing Peter H. 
Rossi, Emily Waite, Christine E. Bose & Richard E. Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: 
Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 AM. SOC. REV. 224 (1974)). 
 68. Tyler, supra note 16, at 226 (“In the case of intellectual property law, these findings 
imply that one crucial problem is the lack of a public feeling that breaking intellectual 
property laws is wrong. In the absence of such a conception, there is little reason for people 
to follow intellectual property laws.”). 
 69. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 64 (1990). 
 70. Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 715. 
 71. Id. at 707. 
 72. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist 
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001). 
 73. As compared to other factors studied, “the only significantly biting constraint upon 
illegal downloading is a moral judgment made by the respondent: those that found the 
activity morally condemnable were significantly less likely to engage in market transactions 
across all categories of participation.” Cox et al., supra note 61, at 305. 
 74. “Sometimes legal authorities cannot rely upon or create a moral consensus behind 
the law. In such situations, they rely upon the public view that they are legitimate authorities 
and, as such, ought to be obeyed.” Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 722. “If citizens believe 
that legal authorities are legitimate, they regard them as entitled to be obeyed.” Id. at 716; 
see also Manesh, supra note 3, ¶ 49. 
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perceived as legitimate.75 To reiterate, “both morality and legitimacy have an effect 
on compliance that is: (1) separate from the influence of risk assessments; and (2) 
stronger than the impact of risk assessments.”76 
B. Citizens Do Not Believe Infringement Is Morally Wrong 
Many writers have acknowledged that copyright lacks the moral underpinnings 
that accompany traditional crimes such as theft.77 While primetime television 
shows like CSI and Law & Order demonstrate nightly how emotionally stirring 
crime can be, Americans have no emotional reaction to infringement.78 Making 
copies of creative works to share is simply not intuitively wrong,79 even to 
consumers who are sensitive to doing the right thing.80 Consumers are not alone 
either, as thirty-five percent of artists, the creators whom copyright is meant to 
incentivize, believe downloading a music or movie file should be legal.81 Thus, 
while study participants will offer rationalizations to reconcile their behavior with 
their general (and honest) respect for the law,82 they do not feel compelled to 
change their behavior or obey the law.83 Copyright sanctions stand without moral 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. Moohr, supra note 7, at 804 (“People who have not internalized the legal standard 
may obey the law because they respect its legitimacy, even when social norms are in 
transition. But if respect and legitimacy are diminished, people will be less likely to obey or 
to impose informal sanctions on others.”). Seale, Polakowski, and Schneider found no 
divergence between personal morals and social norms. Although these are arguably distinct 
concepts, they appear to align functionally with regard to compliance with the law. Seale et 
al., supra note 61, at 29. 
 76. Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 717; see also Manesh, supra note 3, ¶ 42–47 
(describing the neuroscience-based Hybrid Theory of Moral Cognition, wherein people 
make decisions based on unconscious intuition combined with conscious reasoning). 
 77. See, e.g., Manesh, supra note 3, ¶ 40 (“[T]heft is intuitively wrong, but infringement 
is not.”); Moohr, supra note 7, at 794. 
 78. See Oliver R. Goodenough, Institutions, Emotions, and Law: A Goldilocks Problem 
for Mechanism Design, 33 VT. L. REV. 395, 400 (2009). 
 79. “[U]p to sixty percent of those queried do not think it is wrong to use copyrighted 
material . . . .” Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry 
Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 734 (2003).  
 80. See Peukert, supra note 62.  
 81. MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, ARTISTS, MUSICIANS AND THE 
INTERNET (2004), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2004/PIP_Artists.Musicians
_Report.pdf.pdf; see also Chuck D, ‘Free’ Music Can Free the Artist, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 
2000, at A13. Increasingly, artists are electing to release their music online, either for free to 
sample or with the suggestion of a donation directly to the artist. Peukert, supra note 62, at 158 
(“[M]ore and more works are made available by right holders for free downloading.”). 
 82. See Manesh, supra note 3; see also Garbharran & Thatcher, supra note 57, at 2 
(“Moral disengagement was the strongest, significant predictor which offers support for its 
inclusion in models for explaining antisocial conduct, in general, and software piracy 
intentions, in particular.”); id. at 5 (“[M]oral disengagement refers to the extent to which one 
is able to distance oneself from the moral consequences of one’s actions through one or more 
rationalisations . . . .”). 
 83. “[I]f so many are willing to infringe but not to steal, they must be doing so based on 
some moral distinction.” Manesh, supra note 3, ¶ 7.  
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foundation and the accompanying social norms, and they directly conflict with 
other, established social norms.84 These norms undermine the effects of criminal 
prosecution,85 as those prosecuted are not branded with the same social stigma that 
normally attaches to felons.86 For a number of years, academics and others argued 
that infringers might simply be unaware that copyright infringement is illegal, or 
find the law too difficult to understand.87 True or not, this argument underscores the 
fact that copyright infringement lacks the moral impulse of compliance—if people 
felt infringement was wrong like they feel theft and murder are wrong, they would 
not need to understand the law to act legally. 
C. Citizens Do Not Believe Copyright Law Is Legitimate 
As it turns out, knowledge of copyright law has very little effect on citizens’ 
willingness to infringe.88 In a law-abiding society such as the United States,89 this is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. “The public seems to be operating on an implicit standard of fair use, believing that 
some types of behavior are acceptable and others are not. For example, the public appears to 
feel that they should only have to pay for something once.” Tyler, supra note 16, at 228; see 
Moohr, supra note 7, at 795 (“[P]eople are less likely to abide by the law because they have 
not internalized this new standard, which conflicts with the competing social norm that 
copyrighted material is available for personal use.”); Moohr, supra note 79, at 771–73 
(noting the presence of a powerful competing social norm—that the public is free to use 
copyrighted material so long as their use is personal and stating that “[w]hen individuals use 
information products, a powerful and competing social norm is implicated—that 
information, knowledge, and ideas are free for all to use and enjoy”); see also Bartow, supra 
note 6, at 97 (“Those who use libraries on a regular basis may very well see free access to 
information as a societal good rather than a felonious transgression.”); Whitney D. Gunter, 
Internet Scallywags: A Comparative Analysis of Multiple Forms and Measurements of 
Digital Piracy, 10 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 15, 16 (2009), http://wcr.sonoma.edu/v10n1
/Gunter.pdf (“[I]nterviews and focus groups have shown that digital pirates hold many 
beliefs about the ethics of their behavior and find solidarity with other pirates sharing these 
beliefs.”). Illegal file sharing in and of itself presents a solidified social norm. See generally 
Ben DePoorter, Francesco Parisi & Sven Vanneste, Problems with the Enforcement of 
Copyright Law: Is There a Social Norm Backlash?, 12 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 361 (2005). 
 85. Moohr, supra note 7, at 797 (“[T]he absence of a robust social norm against 
copyright infringement indicates that a criminal law will not deter infringement at the 
desired level.”). 
 86. Id. at 796. 
 87. E.g., Bartow, supra note 54, at 23 (“Sheldon Halpern has suggested . . . that because 
copyright law is fractured, inconsistent and difficult to understand, perhaps copyright laws 
do not have a normative role . . . .”); Feldman & Nadler, supra note 18, at 40. 
 88. “Similarly, Reid et al. . . . found no relationship between awareness of copyright law 
and unauthorized copying.” Seale et al., supra note 61, at 38 (citing R.A. Reid, J.K. 
Thompson & J.M. Logsdon, Knowledge and Attitudes of Management Students Toward 
Software Piracy, 33 J. COMPUTER INFO. SYS. 46 (1992)). “Swinyard et al. . . . in their 
cross-cultural analysis of the morality of software piracy, argue that knowledge of copyright 
laws does little to discourage unauthorized copying. Their results indicate that . . . many 
people weigh the outcomes or benefits of illegal copying, more than the legal concerns.” Id. 
at 28 (citing W.R. Swinyard, H. Rinne & A.K. Kau, The Morality of Software Piracy: A 
Cross-Cultural Analysis, 9 J. BUS. ETHICS 655 (1990)). 
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rather unusual—typically, citizens are willing to obey a law on grounds of 
legitimacy alone, either because they respect the process that created the law,90 or 
they respect the intended effects of the law.91 The fact that citizens infringe 
copyright—even when they know doing so is illegal—is a powerful, objective 
indication that the law itself is regarded as illegitimate, foundationally and 
functionally, and thus not deserving of civil obedience. Although federal laws are 
generally perceived as legitimate, “Congress’ decision to increase criminal 
penalties was driven by interest groups seeking copyrights protected by criminal 
sanctions as a means of restricting entry into an increasingly profitable market.”92 
Consequently, existing copyright law is widely and accurately viewed as the result 
of lobbying by special interests—namely the RIAA, MPAA, and similar 
organizations with vested interests in a biased legal standard.93 As if to highlight 
the questionable political landscape surrounding copyright, the Republican Study 
Committee (RSC) recently released a controversial and insightful memo calling for 
copyright reform of the nature described in this Note—only to withdraw the memo 
within twenty-four hours,94 at the behest of MPAA and RIAA lobbyists.95 
Even though special interests lobbied to make the law what it is, the law could 
still be viewed as legitimate if the public saw the law as serving its best interests.96 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Bartow, supra note 6, at 118 (“In cyberspace as in real space, most U.S. citizens (or 
‘netizens’) are law abiding most of the time.”); Tyler, supra note 16, at 228 (“Americans 
have traditionally been law abiding. Studies of citizen behavior suggest that Americans both 
feel strongly obligated to obey the law and generally do so in their everyday lives.”). 
 90. Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 723 (“[L]egitimacy is linked to the fairness of the 
procedures used by authorities to make decisions. Consequently, legal authorities can 
maintain their legitimacy by making decisions ethically.”). 
 91. Tyler, supra note 16, at 233 (“[W]hen citizens are reacting to laws passed by 
Congress the primary reason they obey those laws is that they think that Congress is 
concerned about them and trying to do what is right for all citizens. Citizens are also affected 
by judgments that Congress is neutral and treats all citizens equally.”). The prohibitionist 
movement serves as an example of what happens when Congress’s intentions are rejected by 
the public. See Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 719. 
 92. Lanier Saperstein, Comment, Copyrights, Criminal Sanctions and Economic Rents: 
Applying the Rent Seeking Model to the Criminal Law Formulation Process, 87 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1470, 1472 (1997); see also Moohr, supra note 7, at 799 (“The expense of 
civil suits and the problem of collecting damages from consumers motivate the industry to 
shift the cost of enforcement to the criminal justice system and ultimately to taxpayers.”). 
 93. Manta, supra note 26, at 472 (“[A] number of industries lobby for stronger 
protection for soft IP (especially copyright) . . . .”); see also Moohr, supra note 7, at 798. 
 94. Mike Masnick, That Was Fast: Hollywood Already Browbeat the Republicans into 
Retracting Report on Copyright Reform, TECHDIRT (Nov. 17, 2012, 4:59 PM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121117/16492521084/hollywood-lobbyists-have-busy
-saturday-convince-gop-to-retract-copyright-reform-brief.shtml; Matthew Yglesias, The 
Case of the Vanishing Policy Memo, SLATE (Nov. 19, 2012, 2:23 PM), http://www.slate.com
/articles/business/moneybox/2012/11/rsc_copyright_reform_memo_derek_khanna_tries_to
_get_republican_study_committee.html; see also REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., supra note 51. 
 95. See Masnick, supra note 94 (“[A]s soon as it was published, the MPAA and RIAA 
apparently went ballistic and hit the phones hard, demanding that the RSC take down the 
report. They succeeded.” (emphasis in original)). 
 96. Tyler, supra note 16, at 233 (“If citizens trust that their leaders are trying to do what 
is best for them, they defer voluntarily to legal rules. In the area of intellectual property law, 
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The Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”97 Thus, Congress is instructed 
“to enact laws that give authors certain rights in their work for a limited time for 
the purpose of promoting progress.”98 Unfortunately, academics and industry 
commentators alike have commented that copyright law heavily favors copyright 
holders while disregarding the public interest.99 It is difficult to argue that sanctions 
on infringement are in society’s best interests when file sharing has done nothing to 
curb the development of new creative works100 and may in fact be a boon to 
emerging artists and smaller labels.101 
D. When Laws and Morals Clash, One Must Change 
When a law lacks moral foundation and also fails to stand on legitimacy, the gap 
between the public’s morals and the letter of the law must be addressed. Increasing 
sanctions will not change the public’s view of what is or is not morally sound 
conduct.102 The discrepancy between the public’s morals and the written law can be 
                                                                                                                 
this means that people need to believe that the rules established serve reasonable social 
purposes and are not simply efforts to create profits for special interest groups, such as large 
corporations.”). 
 97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 98. Moohr, supra note 7, at 789 (emphasis added). 
 99. See id. at 802 (“[T]reating personal use infringement as a type of theft creates a bias 
in copyright law that upsets the balance between the two purposes of copyright law. Using 
criminal law to deter unlawful copying emphasizes one purpose of copyright law, to 
encourage creation of new work. That emphasis on the incentive to create implies that the 
goal of maintaining public access is less important, an implication that undermines the 
balance between the dual mandates of copyright law.”). 
 100. See supra Part I. 
 101. Many have argued that file sharing, as a form of sampling, leads to increased sales. 
See, e.g., Ram D. Gopal, Sudip Bhattacharjee & G. Lawrence Sanders, Do Artists Benefit 
from Online Music Sharing?, 79 J. BUS. 1503, 1503 (2006) (“Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, we find that lowering the cost of sampling music will propel more consumers to 
purchase music online as the total cost of evaluation and acquisition decreases.”). Recent 
studies have empirically demonstrated that this is, in fact, the case, as file sharers also legally 
purchase more music than the general population. Joe Karaganis, Where do Music Collections 
Come From?, AM. ASSEMBLY (Oct. 15, 2012), http://piracy.americanassembly.org/where-do
-music-collections-come-from/; see also Bartow, supra note 6, at 115 (“It needs to be 
established through empirical research that nonprofit use of digital copying and sharing 
technologies actually and appreciably affects the royalties of authors and artists before this 
argument is accorded much weight.”); id. at 119–20 (“[I]f the technology’s primary effect is 
to redistribute wealth from traditional music companies to entities utilizing alternative modes 
of distribution, without affecting most artists and authors (or perhaps helping them in the 
process), then the technology [and infringement have] not compromised the goals of 
copyright law.”); Ernesto, 10,000 Artists Sign Up for Pirate Bay Promotion, TORRENTFREAK 
(Nov. 5, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/10000-artists-signed-up-for-pirate-bay-promotion
-12110/ (“[T]housands of lesser known artists are eager to become featured on the [Pirate 
Bay]’s homepage. . . . Those who were lucky enough to be featured have enjoyed a healthy 
career boost and in some cases earned thousands of dollars from file-sharing fans.”). 
 102. See Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with 
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addressed either by changing the law to coincide with commonly held values or by 
educating the public about the merits and value of the law.103 In a political 
environment increasingly characterized as the RIAA versus the criminal public, the 
only changes to the law have taken it further from the public’s view of legitimacy; 
instead of making laws that the public will accept and support, much attention and 
most efforts have been directed at correcting the deviant public’s apparently 
underdeveloped moral compass.104 
IV. WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE PEOPLE BY CALLING THEM THIEVES 
In conjunction with their heightened efforts at civil enforcement, the RIAA and 
MPAA have conducted massive marketing campaigns aimed at educating the 
public about the “correct” moral implications of copyright infringement. The RIAA 
has attempted to convince colleges to do the work for it, for instance, by revoking 
network access from students suspected of file sharing.105 The MPAA has branded 
home DVDs with anti-infringement ads proclaiming the now-familiar mantra:  
YOU WOULDN’T STEAL A CAR 
YOU WOULDN’T STEAL A HANDBAG 
YOU WOULDN’T STEAL A TELEVISION 
YOU WOULDN’T STEAL A DVD 
DOWNLOADING PIRATED FILMS IS STEALING 
STEALING IS AGAINST THE LAW106 
These organizations have attempted to persuade the public that copyright 
infringement is the same as stealing physical property, hoping that existing morals 
forbidding theft would take root in the world of intellectual property. 
It is debatable whether either the government or private interests can forcibly 
alter existing morals or social norms that have already taken root in the 
                                                                                                                 
Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 370 (1999) (“Norms are not 
necessarily promulgated at all. If they are, it is not by the state.”); Moohr, supra note 7, at 
797 n.45 (“[U]sing criminal law to educate the public gives short shrift to the retributive, 
moral justification for criminal law. . . . [C]riminal law is most appropriately used to enforce 
established community norms. Violators are subject to moral condemnation and stigma 
precisely because the criminal law embodies and expresses the community’s norms.”). 
 103. Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 726. 
 104. See Ram D. Gopal, G. Lawrence Sanders, Sudip Bhattacharjee, Manish Agrawal & 
Suzanne C. Wagner, A Behavioral Model of Digital Music Piracy, 14 J. ORGANIZATIONAL 
COMPUTING & ELEC. COMM. 89 (2004); Tyler, supra note 16, at 229 (“[W]e need to create an 
awareness of and commitment to the moral principles that  underlie formal laws. In 
particular, the public’s awareness of the reasons underlying intellectual property rules needs 
to be developed more effectively, so that a basis for a positive moral climate can be 
created.”); D. Ian Hopper, FBI Pushes for Cyber Ethics Education, ABC NEWS (Oct. 10, 
2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=119369&page=1. 
 105. See RIAA Launches New Initiatives Targeting Campus Music Theft, SLYCK (Feb. 28, 
2007, 1:01 PM), http://www.slyck.com/forums/viewtopic.php?p=390661.  
 106. Patricia Loughlan, “You Wouldn’t Steal a Car . . .” Intellectual Property and the 
Language of Theft 1 (Sydney Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08/35, 2008). 
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community.107 Since copyright seems to be a morally neutral subject that does not 
elicit strong positive or negative reactions from consumers, it is not unreasonable to 
think that the public could be persuaded to adopt a moral standpoint on the issue. 
Trying to adopt for copyright the existing moral culpability for theft of private 
property was certainly a promising approach to correcting the discrepancy between 
the law and the public’s morals—and the resulting behavior. 
Theoretically promising or not, equating infringement to theft has clearly failed. 
“The relentless ‘piracy is a crime’ message . . . just irritates people”;108 educating 
the public on the merits of the law is, of course, only effective if the law aligns with 
public morals.109 Copyright infringement is not theft—literally, legally, 
philosophically, or cognitively. While the literal, legal, and philosophical 
differences can rationally explain the rejection of the theft argument, exploring the 
cognitive differences between theft and infringement offers promising insights for 
the future of copyright and indicates that copyright does have moral implications 
that could resound with the public. 
A. Literally and Intuitively 
In the most literal sense, copyright infringement is not theft.110 If a criminal 
steals a computer, he deprives the owner forever of control, use, or benefits derived 
from that computer. If a criminal copies a song from another’s computer, the owner 
of the computer and song is not deprived of property, no resources are consumed, 
and no one is harmed (unless it can be proven that the criminal otherwise would 
have purchased the song from the artist). Possessing intellectual property in no way 
precludes others from using it,111 in obvious contrast to stealing a car.112 Intellectual 
property is a rather unique concept and differs substantially from the ubiquitous 
concept of tangible personal property.113 Those differences are not merely 
theoretical, as “at an intuitive level, people do distinguish between property rights 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. A sociological study conducted in Sweden addressing the argument that changing 
the law will change the corresponding social norms found that social norms were unaffected 
by changes to copyright law. Måns Svensson & Stefan Larsson, Intellectual Property Law 
Compliance in Europe: Illegal File Sharing and the Role of Social Norms, 14 NEW MEDIA & 
SOC’Y 1147 (2012), available at http://nms.sagepub.com/content/14/7/1147. But see Mark F. 
Schultz, Reconciling Social Norms and Copyright Law: Strategies for Persuading People to 
Pay for Recorded Music, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 59, 81–86 (2009) (arguing “copynorms” can 
and should be changed when they clash with the law). 
 108. Helen O’Hara, You Wouldn’t Steal a Car . . . , EMPIRE BLOG (Apr. 3, 2009, 
11:06 PM), http://www.empireonline.com/empireblogs/words-from-the-wise/post/p499. 
 109. See Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 726. 
 110. See Bartow, supra note 6, at 96 (“These actions [(infringement)] don’t seem like 
theft at the level of abstraction on which most people operate.”). 
 111. Seale et al., supra note 61, at 29. 
 112. See Bartow, supra note 6, at 97. 
 113. Seale et al., supra note 61, at 29; see also Hoffstadt, supra note 25, at 914 
(“Critically, intellectual property is distinct from most other forms of property because it is a 
‘public good’ insofar as it is naturally nonrivalrous (that is, it is not consumed when used) 
and nonexclusive (that is, more than one person can use it at the same time).” (citations 
omitted)). 
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that inhere in physical objects and those that inhere in intangibles.”114 Treating 
copyright infringement as synonymous to common theft naturally makes many 
citizens uncomfortable.115 
B. Legally and Technically 
In Dowling v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that 
copyright infringement was tantamount to physical theft or that it should be treated 
as such.116 Professor Brian M. Hoffstadt explored this legal distinction: 
“[T]raditional property law concepts have been imported into intellectual property 
law with little or no consideration given to the theoretical and utilitarian 
distinctiveness of intellectual property.”117 Theft of physical property interferes 
with the owner’s rights to enjoy his or her property but also permanently 
dispossesses the owner of the property itself.118 Copyright infringement only 
interferes with the right holder’s exclusivity rights, while it dispossesses no one of 
property—arguably the worse of the two harms caused by actual theft.119 Thus, 
“[a]lthough the theft paradigm would initially seem to be the most appropriate for 
all types of property, such a homogenous approach to property theory yields a 
paradigm that is logically unsound and has spawned a pragmatic quagmire.”120 
Hoffstadt concludes that infringement is much more comparable to trespass, if it 
must be compared to a crime involving physical property, as trespass also involves 
a mere interference with exclusive rights.121 Hoffstadt’s analysis of the legal 
principles underlying these crimes demonstrates their technical differences. 
However, he subsequently relies entirely on deterrence principles and describes 
copyright infringers as immoral “civil-judgment-proof persons (to whom only the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some 
Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 212 (2002); see also Peukert, supra note 62, at 20.  
 115. See Moohr, supra note 79, at 733. 
 116. Loughlan, supra note 106, at 4. 
 117. Hoffstadt, supra note 25, at 911; see also id. at 950 (“Despite the attractiveness of 
treating all property similarly and hence equating criminal infringement of intellectual 
property rights with the theft of tangible property, this homogenous approach overlooks the 
salient fact that the intrusion occasioned by these two types of criminal activity is 
theoretically distinct.”). 
 118. Id. at 915 (“Theft of a tangible item involves two distinct theoretical harms: the 
owner is dispossessed of the property and the owner’s use and enjoyment of that property is 
subject to interference due to the dispossession.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 119. See id. at 958 (“When a criminal . . . infringes a copyrighted work, . . . the criminal 
has only inflicted one type of harm—he has interfered with the asset owner’s exclusive right 
to control the intellectual property.”). 
 120. Id. at 960 (emphasis omitted). 
 121. Id. at 916 (“[T]he theoretically sound approach in imposing [a] sentence for 
intellectual property crimes is to apply—not the theft paradigm under-girding the 
Guidelines—but instead a trespass paradigm, one that focuses on the defendant’s 
interference with the owner’s exclusive use and enjoyment of the intellectual property asset.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
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criminal law may be a deterrent),”122 and calls for useless increases to deterrence 
efforts while ignoring the effects of personal morals and social norms on behavior, 
even as he acknowledges their existence and relevance to copyright.123 
C. Philosophically, Why These Laws Exist 
Philosophically, theft and infringement have deep and irreconcilable differences. 
Although both involve “property,” the purposes underlying tangible and intellectual 
property rights are quite distinct.124 Theft violates the most basic of property rights 
that provide the foundation for society.125 The principles of property law are 
thousands of years old and, although they benefit culture and society, the laws exist 
principally to protect the individual.126 Copyright law is, by contrast, a very new 
convention, created by society for society.127 Thus, intellectual property is a tool 
with which Congress is to promote progress of science and the arts for society.128 
While property law exists to benefit individuals and supports society as a 
byproduct, intellectual property rights exist to benefit society and support artists as 
a byproduct. Theft is a direct violation of the principles of property law and 
undermines society. Copyright infringement does not harm society unless it 
actually discourages the artist from creating new works.129 The economic analysis 
of copyright espoused by industry130 and adopted by some politicians,131 which 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. Id. at 913. 
 123. See id. (“[S]ome judges may be inclined to impose lower sentences as a means of 
recognizing that intellectual property infringement is not generally perceived to be a serious 
crime . . . .”). 
 124. Moohr, supra note 79, at 733 (“The common understandings that underpin theft law 
do not transfer easily to the realm of information, knowledge, and ideas.”). 
 125. See Oliver R. Goodenough & Gregory Decker, Why Do Good People Steal 
Intellectual Property?, in LAW, MIND, AND BRAIN 345, 357–59 (Michael Freeman & Oliver 
R. Goodenough eds., 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1518952. Contra THOMAS 
HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN (Oxford University Press 1947) (1651) (arguing that property is a 
social construct, devoid of biological or ancestral foundations). 
 126. See Goodenough & Decker, supra note 125, at 357–59. 
 127. In contrast to property’s deep and intuitive roots, “[i]ntellectual property is nothing 
more than a socially-recognized, but imaginary, set of fences and gates. People must believe 
in it for it to be effective.” Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, 
Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613, 616 (1996). 
 128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 129. Seale et al., supra note 61, at 27 (“[S]ociety often benefits from the free exchange of 
ideas. Many philosophers and economists contend that intellectual property rights should not 
be protected by law . . . .” (citing D. M. Davidson, Reverse Engineering Software Under 
Copyright Law: The IBM PC BIOS, in OWNING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 
147 (V. Weil and J.W. Snapper eds., 1989))). 
 130. See Julian Sanchez, 750,000 Lost Jobs? The Dodgy Digits Behind the War on 
Piracy, ARSTECHNICA (Oct. 8, 2008, 12:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2008
/10/dodgy-digits-behind-the-war-on-piracy/ (discussing “dodgy” claims that file sharing 
costs the U.S. economy $250 billion and 750,000 jobs). 
 131. E.g., Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Hatch, Grassley Unveil Targeted Bill 
to Counter Online Infringement (May 12, 2011), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov
/press/leahy-hatch-grassley-unveil-targeted-bill-to-counter-online-infringement. 
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maintains that copyright must be used to protect jobs and profits, is inappropriate to 
the extent it serves economic goals rather than the constitutionally sanctioned goal 
of progressing science and the arts for all of society.132 
D. Cognitive Foundations and Their Respective Morals 
The philosophical foundations of property and intellectual rights lead us to the 
cognitive differences that underlie theft and infringement. Behaviors far removed 
from our ancestral roots, unlike the theft of physical property, lack innate moral 
foundations in our minds.133 “Infringement does not violate our intuitive 
understanding of ownership. As a result, the act of infringement does not trigger the 
same negative intuitive response as theft of tangible property.”134 Professor 
Goodenough, in conjunction with neuroscientists, has explored the cognitive 
foundation that intellectual property does rest on. He posits that the human brain 
may not be physically wired to recognize intellectual property as tangible objects 
deserving of “emotionally reinforced normative judgment.”135 “We may respect, 
even revere, creativity; we may keep knowledge private as a secret; but we are also 
happy to appropriate ideas, expression, and other products of the intellect, and put 
them to our own use, with little, if any, qualm.”136 Considering the psychological, 
cognitive, and possibly biological roots of this respect for ideas, Goodenough 
theorizes that creativity is more appropriately coupled with prestige and status than 
with monetary reward.137 Considering infringement according to his theory in other 
contexts, such as plagiarism, we discover a moral foundation exists for 
infringement, albeit one starkly different from that underscoring physical 
property.138 From an ancestral perspective, intellectual properties and ideas are 
either hoarded for personal benefit or shared for social recognition and acclaim.139 
This exchange for acclaim or respect for the choice not to distribute relies heavily 
on a relationship between the parties.140 
Although artists certainly enjoy economic benefits in addition to acclaim, 
Goodenough’s theory finds support from many perspectives. If consumers 
processed intellectual property in purely economic terms, none would purchase 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. Moohr, supra note 79, at 733 (“[T]he results of criminalizing personal use of 
copyrighted material are inconsistent with the underlying policy of copyright law.”). 
 133. See Manesh, supra note 3, ¶¶ 54, 62. 
 134. Id. ¶ 74. 
 135. Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 63, at 1721. 
 136. Goodenough, supra note 78, at 400.  
 137. See Goodenough & Decker, supra note 125, at 361–62. 
 138. See Green, supra note 114, at 242 (“[T]he norm-based rule of attribution—despite 
some fraying around the edges—is still viewed, at least by those within the relevant 
communities, as imposing a powerful moral imperative. As we seek ways to make our 
intellectual property law more robust, we would do well to look to the normative structures 
surrounding plagiarism for guidance.”).  
 139. See Goodenough & Decker, supra note 125, at 361–62. 
 140. Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 63, at 1721 (“In such a context, inhibitions on 
exploitation and use . . . depend on a relationship between the parties.”). 
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music on iTunes given the availability of free music on file sharing services,141 yet 
iTunes and other digital distribution services have been very successful142 and have 
a demonstrable impact on the demand for copyright-infringing content.143 If artists 
processed intellectual property in purely economic terms, none would make music 
under the old business model because artists make very little or even no money in 
the employ of huge record labels, and yet these artists have continued to make 
music.144 Some artists have demonstrated their noneconomic drive by embracing 
digital distribution directly, and in so doing embraced their fans—making their 
music available online for free, accepting donations, and circumventing the 
antiquated recording industry by relying on relationships with those who listen to 
them.145 
The theory holds outside the music industry on a more basic level. Goodenough 
describes how, for academics and scholars, “copying, re-use, and adoption is the 
best reward” for their work, provided they are given proper credit.146 Research 
conducted among children demonstrates that they understand the ownership of 
ideas by the age of five and innately dislike the unauthorized copying of those 
ideas.147 The study of children failed to address the effects of attribution. 
Experience tells us someone is not a “copycat” if they give the originator credit for 
the idea—the individual then turns from a copycat into a promoter. Goodenough 
posits that fans repay their favorite artists with appreciation and social deference.148 
However, fans who claim to repay artists by sharing their music with new 
audiences, attending their concerts, and promoting the artist among peers are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. Record labels clearly do operate in strictly economic terms, as James Gianopulos, 
cochairman of Twentieth Century Fox stated: “We can’t compete with free. That’s an 
economic paradigm that doesn’t work.” Anne Thompson, Tinseltown Follies, N.Y. MAG., 
May 5, 2003, at 16. 
 142. See RIAA Launches New Initiatives Targeting Campus Music Theft, supra note 105 
(“A legal marketplace that barely existed in 2003 is now a billion dollar business showing 
real promise.”). 
 143. Brett Danaher, Samita Dhanasobhon, Michael D. Smith & Rahul Telang, 
Converting Pirates Without Cannibalizing Purchasers: The Impact of Digital Distribution 
on Physical Sales and Internet Piracy, 29 MARKETING SCI. 1138, 1138 (2010) (finding that 
“NBC’s decision to remove its content from iTunes in December 2007 is causally associated 
with an 11.4% increase in the demand for NBC’s pirated content”). 
 144. C.f. Cord Jefferson, The Music Industry’s Funny Money, ROOT (July 6, 2010, 5:48 AM), 
http://www.theroot.com/views/how-much-do-you-musicians-really-make?page=0,1 (noting for 
every $1000 in music sold, the average musician takes home roughly $23.40); Love, supra 
note 32 (“Of course, [the band] had fun. Hearing yourself on the radio, selling records, 
getting new fans and being on TV is great, but now the band doesn’t have enough money to 
pay the rent and nobody has any credit.”). 
 145. Eric Garland, The ‘In Rainbows’ Experiment: Did It Work?, NPR MUSIC BLOG 
(Nov. 16, 2009, 10:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/monitormix/2009/11/the_in_rainbows
_experiment_did.html. 
 146. Goodenough & Decker, supra note 125, at 362. 
 147. Kristina R. Olson & Alex Shaw, ‘No Fair, Copycat!’: What Children’s Response to 
Plagiarism Tells Us About Their Understanding of Ideas, 14 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 431, 431 
(2011). 
 148. Goodenough & Decker, supra note 125, at 362–63. 
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dismissed by most current literature as trying to rationalize unconscionable file 
sharing behavior.149 
E. Summarizing What the Theft and Infringement Comparison Teaches Us 
Existing copyright laws were built on the premise that copyright violations 
could be punished in ways directly analogous to property violations.150 Deterrence 
efforts and education campaigns have attempted to convince the public that the two 
actions carry identical moral implications. Considering the literal, legal, theoretical, 
and cognitive differences between tangible and intellectual property, it is no 
wonder that file sharing norms have flourished despite legal sanctions and 
condemning rhetoric. Comparing infringement to theft only serves to reinforce 
social norms condoning infringement, further distancing the law, common 
behavior, and the underlying morals.151 “[T]he language of theft in the discourse of 
intellectual property ought at least to be constantly noted for what it is, that is, an 
inaccurate and manipulative distortion of legal and moral reality.”152 Pursuing theft 
rhetoric at this point obscures and detracts from the real issues surrounding 
copyright law.153 Deterrence has not worked and will not work within the bounds of 
reason,154 the body of law is viewed as illegitimate, and attempts to change the 
public’s amoral view of copyright as property have been a complete flop.  
V. MAKING THE HARD DECISION TO END PROHIBITION 
When public morality aligns with a law, compliance can be increased through 
education and publicity. 155 When public morality does not align with the law, the 
law must be reexamined and the discrepancy must be addressed.156 Copyright law 
must be modernized, returned to a legitimate legal foundation, and reconciled with 
public intuitions about what is morally right.157 Given the political challenges 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
 150. Manta, supra note 26, at 473 (“[P]olicymakers have largely relied upon analogies to 
property law in their decisions to introduce and legitimize criminal sanctions for violations 
of IP laws.”). 
 151. See Seale et al., supra note 61, at 38. 
 152. Loughlan, supra note 106, at 2.  
 153. Id. at 9 (“There is a serious and complicated political issue about the optimal 
balance to be struck between intellectual property rights and social freedoms and decent, 
ordinary language is the appropriate language of the issue.”). 
 154. See Moohr, supra note 7, at 796 (“[I]n order to obtain adequate deterrence of 
copyright infringement, legislators may need to increase penalties to unpalatable levels that 
do not reflect the harm or moral content of the violation, increase markedly the dollars spent 
on enforcement, or both.”). 
 155. Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 739; see also Goodenough, supra note 78, at 401 
(“If some more compelling emotional basis for compliance cannot be found, aspects of IP 
law may simply need to be rethought.”). 
 156. Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 739. 
 157. Id. at 719 (“To sustain its moral authority, the law must be experienced as consistent 
with people’s sense of morality. If not, people’s desire to do what is morally right will not 
lead them to support legal authorities and obey the law.”). 
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inherent in copyright reform, namely the enormous lobbying power of those 
invested in the current legal scheme, existing copyright cannot be reformed in a 
constructive way, only supplemented.158  
Congress should create a new form of copyright available through the existing 
U.S. Copyright Office. Artists creating new content would have the option to use 
either new copyright or the older scheme. Although private licensing agreements, 
such as Creative Commons,159 already exist to circumvent copyright law, these do 
nothing to restore legitimacy to the law. New copyright must be firmly grounded in 
constitutional authority, favoring the public and the progress of the arts, while 
providing adequate incentives for artists. It must also rest firmly on moral 
foundations, namely the relationship between artists and consumers. Eventually, 
new copyright can supplant, rather than supplement, existing copyright. 
“The Constitutional mandate expresses a two-fold purpose: to encourage authors 
to create expressive material and to provide public access to that material. 
Copyright law is thus a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.”160 When 
artists’ interests and those of the public conflict, the public’s interests should be 
favored, quite the opposite of current copyright law.161 
The draconian deterrence methods available for current copyright can have no 
place in new copyright. There should be no criminal sanctions for noncommercial 
personal infringement, and civil penalties should not so grossly violate principles of 
commensurate punishment and fairness.162  
[C]alling something ‘criminal’ is an ideological and moral claim. It 
categorizes a particular behaviour as an act that causes social harm, one 
that injures everyone in a geographically defined area. The act is no 
longer a private matter, nor a dispute to be settled by the parties directly 
involved. Furthermore, calling an act a crime is a claim for public 
resources, a summons that obligates the state to monitor and enforce.163 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. International treaties may also prevent overhaul of existing copyright laws, requiring 
a workaround solution. 
 159. About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/. 
 160. Moohr, supra note 7, at 789 (citation omitted). 
 161. This conclusion is highly controversial; most academics have lost sight of the forest 
through the trees and seem to have accepted the argument that artists’ interests are as 
important as those of the public for which they are creating content. See Hoffstadt, supra 
note 25, at 966 (“[T]he protection afforded to intellectual property rights represents a trade-
off between the encouragement of creative works by offering them some form of statutory 
protection, and the publication and dissemination of those works in the public domain; 
tipping the balance in either direction diminishes at least one of the competing policy goals.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 162. See von Hirsch, supra note 67, at 66–76 (discussing the importance of the law 
coinciding with the public’s perception of fairness). 
 163. Laureen Snider, Theft of Time: Disciplining Through Science and Law, 40 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 89, 94–95 (2002); see also DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS 
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 103 (2008) (“Penal statutes must proscribe a nontrivial harm or evil; 
hardship and stigma may be imposed only for conduct that is in some sense wrongful; 
violations of criminal laws must result in punishments that are deserved; and the burden of 
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Criminal penalties are inappropriate when they produce greater harm than the  
acts they aim to deter.164 Presently, criminal penalties are not preventing 
infringement, but they are eroding the perceived legitimacy of the legal system.165 
They could hardly do otherwise when copyright law is punished more severely than 
some states address assault or drunk driving, crimes that are widely condemned 
morally and socially. All the while the harm caused by infringement has not been 
shown and many argue for the benefits of file sharing to artists.166 It makes no 
sense to criminalize behavior that is arguably good for artists, content generators, 
and supposed victims of copyright infringement.167  
In addition to barring unreasonable criminal penalties, new copyright must 
address civil allowances. A civil penalty of $80,000 for downloading a song 
available for $0.99 on iTunes is painfully disproportionate to the damage caused 
and shocks the conscience.168 Besides making civil penalties more proportional to 
the damage caused (for instance awarding damages comparable to the actual cost of 
the content), new copyright should require plaintiffs to show actual harm, as they 
are for other lawsuits such as product liability, not the mere possibility of harm.169 
Awarding damages because an alleged infringer might have otherwise purchased 
content creates a double standard that is not lost on the public. For example, 
Universal Music Group won a sizable $100 million in its lawsuit against 
My.MP3.com despite the fact that Universal “made no effort to show that it had 
lost sales as a result of My.MP3.com.”170 A legal system is much more likely to be 
                                                                                                                 
proof should be placed on those who advocate the imposition of criminal sanctions.”). 
 164. See Moohr, supra note 7, at 786 (citing Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, in THE UTILITARIANS 162 (Dolphin Books 1961) 
(1789)); see also Hoffstadt, supra note 25, at 962 (“The appropriate vehicle for assessing the 
intellectual property owner’s loss, if any harm is actually caused but is difficult to measure, 
is the cost that the owner would charge for a license to use the asset.”). 
 165. Moohr, supra note 7, at 804 n.75 (“[U]se of criminal sanctions for morally neutral 
laws dilutes the effectiveness of community condemnation for criminal conduct in general.” 
(citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 
421 (1958))). 
 166. Gopal et al., supra note 101; see also David Blackburn, On-line Piracy and 
Recorded Music Sales 24–25 (Harvard Univ., Working Paper, 2004), available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.117.2922&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
(finding 75% of artists benefit from online file sharing). 
 167. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 168. Cross, supra note 25, at 1038; see also Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 720 (“‘[I]f 
a rule derived by desert theorists is judged overwhelmingly by the community to be unjust, 
such disagreement may cast some doubt upon the accuracy of the rule in assessing a person’s 
moral blameworthiness’ . . . . [P]eople are less likely to accept the law, since it will not 
correspond to their own sense of what is right and wrong.” (quoting PAUL H. ROBINSON & 
JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME 6 (1995))). 
 169. See Bartow, supra note 6, at 117. 
 170. Id.; see also id. at 119 (“If, as some observers suspect, the ultimate goal of content 
providers is to eliminate circumvention not only so they can capture escaping access fees, 
but so they can also ratchet up access fees, at a minimum they should not be allowed to 
pursue that goal without demonstrating entitlement to relief by establishing quantifiable 
losses.”). 
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respected and abided by if it is perceived as fair.171 Draconian criminal and civil 
penalties for noncommercial infringement are a tremendous barrier to the law’s 
being perceived as legitimate and must be drastically revised for new copyright. 
The penalties for infringement must be directly proportional to the perceived 
seriousness of the crime. 
In order to gain voluntary compliance with new copyright, it is vital that the law 
rest on a moral foundation.172 Professor Goodenough’s theory indicates a strong 
moral foundation could come from building a renewed relationship between 
consumers and artists.173 One way to enforce this relationship would be to place a 
floor on the percent of sales proceeds that must make their way to artists’ own 
pockets.174 If consumers know that for every dollar they spend, at least one-half, or 
even one-third, of that dollar is guaranteed to go to the artist, they are much more 
likely to find a legal way to purchase the media.175 This theory is proven by ticket 
sales, which are perceived as more beneficial to artists themselves and have 
remained strong despite the availability of free content online.176 Artists have 
demonstrated the value of this relationship with their fans by making their music 
available (legally) for free online and successfully soliciting direct donations. 
Restoring the relationship between artists and consumers will also remove the 
ambivalence consumers feel about harming faceless corporations.177 Ensuring that 
every song not purchased actually results in loss to the artist will add a personal and 
moral foundation to the law.178 Although legislating this type of solution may be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 171. Tyler & Darley, supra note 15, at 739. 
 172. See Tyler, supra note 16, at 225. 
 173. The very technologies vilified by the industry as facilitating copyright infringement 
could hold the key to bringing artists closer to consumers than ever: “Inexpensive techniques 
for promoting and distributing works could promote creation of large numbers of diverse 
works. Such technologies could actually result in the originators of creative works capturing a 
greater portion of the income streams that their efforts generate, especially where digital 
technologies significantly reduce production and transaction costs.” Bartow, supra note 6, at 
107. Some suggest that existing intermediaries are obstacles to establishing functional norms: 
“[O]verarching norms that are inclusive of, and responsive to, the needs of end consumers are 
unlikely to emerge, largely due to the power imbalance between large copyright owners and 
discreet individuals.” Bartow, supra note 54, at 24 (citing Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read 
Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 
981, 985 (1996)). 
 174. This suggestion is far from novel, as it has been advanced by academics and actually 
implemented in California. See Bartow, supra note 6, at 110. 
 175. Compare this to current industry arrangements wherein artists receive roughly 2.34% 
of every dollar spent on their music. See Jefferson, supra note 144. 
 176. See Lee, supra note 12 (“From 1999 to 2009, concert ticket sales in the US tripled 
from $1.5 billion to $4.6 billion, vastly exceeding the growth of inflation and population 
growth.”). 
 177. See Dena Cox, Anthony D. Cox & George P. Moschis, When Consumer Behavior 
Goes Bad: An Investigation of Adolescent Shoplifting, 17 J. CONSUMER RES. 149, 152 (1990) 
(“It may be easiest to rationalize theft when it is targeted at large, impersonal organizations.”). 
 178. Manesh, supra note 3, ¶ 76 (“Empirical evidence already suggests the mind makes an 
intuitive distinction between harm through direct, personal contact and indirect and impersonal 
contact.”). 
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repugnant to ideals of free trade, industry players—namely those currently 
perceived as hoarding a disproportionate piece of the pie—could easily ensure that 
artists receive a portion of sales proceeds. 
To accompany this new relationship, awareness campaigns should be conducted, 
not only to announce new copyright, but to reframe infringement: no longer as 
theft, but instead as free-riding. Free riders are morally culpable and antagonized in 
our society,179 albeit not as intensely as thieves, and the foundation for that 
culpability rests much closer to how consumers view copyrighted content. Calling a 
thief a murderer does not make him feel bad, it just angers or confuses him. Calling 
a free loader a thief has not done any good either. Calling the behavior what it is 
may actually generate some moral culpability and the corresponding voluntary 
compliance.  
Lawmakers should seriously consider granting new copyright only short 
duration and limited renewal periods. Current provisions are unjustifiably extreme, 
guaranteeing exclusive rights for the lifetime of the artist and an additional seventy 
years thereafter. These provisions do nothing to serve the public interest and are far 
more extreme than necessary to incentivize creative works. Copyright establishes a 
narrow government-condoned monopoly in order to incentivize creative output, not 
to establish dynasties for successful artists’ families (if artists kept ownership of 
their copyrights). Shorter copyright duration would have international implications 
that are outside the scope of this Note. 
Private services could also do much to support the success of new copyright. 
With cloud-streaming technologies and services such as Spotify, intermediaries are 
making it increasingly easy for consumers to view and access one another’s music 
collections. Services that wish to promote new copyright could provide publicly 
visible file classifications or certifications, signifying which files music consumers 
have purchased and guaranteeing they have contributed to the author. Any system 
carrying this sort of indicator would contribute to fostering a social norm that 
supports respect for the consumer-artist relationship.180 Rather than using 
promotional merchandise as an additional income stream, self-promoting artists 
should give t-shirts and other publicly visible merchandise to paying fans in order 
to publicize the consumer-artist relationship. 
Like any issue, copyright law does not exist within a void and any discussion of 
change must consider the existing industry that controls and relies on existing 
copyright schemes. New copyright, as this Note has proposed it, would be better 
for artists and consumers and would stand a chance of restoring legitimacy to a 
branch of law that is currently something of a joke. The only people who have 
reason to take issue with new copyright are intermediaries like the RIAA. For many 
years, the RIAA has represented a legitimate interest in the copyright debate. Not 
only did the RIAA contractually represent artists themselves, but corporate 
intermediaries in their position were also logistically necessary. These behemoth 
intermediaries provided the capital needed to create industry-standard quality 
                                                                                                                 
 
 179. See generally Robin P. Cubitt, Michalis Drouvelis & Simon Gächter, Framing and 
Free Riding: Moral Judgments, Emotional Responses, and Punishment in Social Dilemma 
Games (Univ. of Nottingham, 2007), available at http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/afse-jee
/Papiers/96.pdf. 
 180. See Tyler, supra note 16, at 225. 
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creative works as well as the network necessary for creative works to reach 
anywhere beyond a local audience.181 Today, however, corporate resources are 
unnecessary to create commercial-quality media.182 Similarly, the Internet has built 
a distribution system and network available to all artists, with no agent and no 
corporate contracts necessary.183 Intermediaries like the RIAA cling to antiquated 
business models that are impractical and unnecessary.184 The intermediaries’ only 
remaining argument is that they employ thousands and that their industry needs to 
be kept afloat through protectionist lawmaking. This economic argument may be 
valid in some arenas, but not in intellectual property. The Constitution does not 
authorize copyright for economic purposes and if those economic purposes do not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 181. Necessary resources aside, intermediaries have also been known to abuse their 
power. 
For example, the rock musician Prince was limited by Warner Brothers 
Records, Inc., to producing one record every eighteen months, even though he 
wanted to release a record every seven months, presumably because such 
limitations made his music more unique and valuable. The company also 
refused to release a three-CD set that Prince wanted to craft and distribute. 
These may have been prudent business decisions with respect to Warner 
Brothers’ profits, but they did not further the copyright goals of creation and 
dissemination of artistic works. 
Bartow, supra note 6, at 108 (citations omitted); see also id. at 113 (“If single entities own or 
control both creative products and retail sales channels, consumers may be at their mercy 
with respect to both access and pricing.”). 
 182. Wilson Castleman, Do Artists Need Record Labels? 4 (Dec. 15, 2009) (unpublished 
student paper) (on file with Washington University’s Olin Business School), available at 
http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/cres/research/calendar/files/wcastlemanartists.pdf (“[I]nexpensive 
personal recording technology is constantly improving and decreasing in cost, meaning that 
near studio-quality recording is available to almost anyone who has a computer.”). 
 183. See Bartow, supra note 6, at 99 (“Low barriers to entry foster competition, which 
poses threats to industries accustomed to oligarchic control of distribution, such as the 
music, movie, and publishing industries, and foments both opportunity and uncertainty. 
Savvy, preexisting real-space distributors with good industry relationships and quality 
products and services would intuitively be in the best positions to utilize innovative new 
modes of content distribution in a profitable manner. Conversely, large, ponderous entities 
that buttress their industry hegemony through distortive exploitation of power imbalances 
rather than effective business practices are appropriately concerned that increased 
competition can threaten their market dominance.”); Moohr, supra note 79, at 758 (“The 
tools of digitization, broadband capacity, and the Internet make low-cost distribution a 
reality that may stimulate creation. Although in its infant stages, Internet commerce allows 
authors, musicians, and others to sell their work directly to consumers. Avoiding the added 
costs imposed by distribution companies may decrease costs to consumers.”). 
 184. Traditional retail outlets have also not been shy about fighting the transition to 
convenient digital distribution of content, apparently more concerned about the threat of 
convenient new business models than the alleged threat of copyright infringement. See Danaher 
et al., supra note 143, at 1138–39 (discussing Walmart’s and Target’s aggressive reactions to 
Disney’s decision to distribute content through iTunes). Danaher et al. go on to find, ironically, 
that such resistance is unwarranted as “customers who cannot purchase digitally may turn to 
piracy, [but] they do not consider DVD box sets—at least those sold on Amazon.com [or 
through traditional retailers]—as a substitute to digital downloads.” Id. at 1139. 
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serve the greater creative needs of society, it is unclear under what authority 
Congress is acting. If these businesses want to remain relevant, they should do so 
by modernizing their business models rather than lobbying for destructive 
legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to maintain a functional, law-abiding society, we must address the 
declining respect for the legal system and the legislature. Copyright law stands as a 
prime candidate for reform, as the public has soundly rejected the current legal 
framework, as well as attempts to teach “correct” morals. “The effectiveness of 
intellectual property law is . . . heavily dependent on gaining voluntary cooperation 
with the law.”185 In order to gain voluntary compliance, the law must rest on 
legitimate foundations and must align with, rather than contradict, the morals held 
by the people. 
“History teaches that change in the old order is a practical certainty.”186 Private 
companies can make content available conveniently and inexpensively, and the 
legislature can give consumers an actual reason to prefer legal purchases to 
infringement. By creating copyrights like those described in this Note, a morally 
potent relationship can be forged between consumers and artists. Even those 
consumers who are not compelled by the moral foundations of the new legal order 
would be more likely to respect and follow the law knowing that it was established 
on constitutional foundations to benefit the public and to incentivize artists, rather 
than to serve a dying industry’s persuasive lobbyists. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 185. Tyler, supra note 16, at 224 (emphasis omitted).  
 186. Moohr, supra note 79, at 732. 
